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Recent empirical work highlights the heterogeneity of social competitions such as political cam-
paigns: proponents of some ideologies seek debate and conversation, others create echo chambers.
While symmetric and static network structure is typically used as a substrate to study such com-
petitor dynamics, network structure can instead be interpreted as a signature of the competitor
strategies, yielding competition dynamics on adaptive networks. Here we demonstrate that trade-
offs between aggressiveness and defensiveness (i.e., targeting adversaries vs. targeting like-minded
individuals) creates paradoxical behaviour such as non-transitive dynamics. And while there is an
optimal strategy in a two competitor system, three competitor systems have no such solution; the
introduction of extreme strategies can easily affect the outcome of a competition, even if the extreme
strategies have no chance of winning. Not only are these results reminiscent of classic paradoxical
results from evolutionary game theory, but the structure of social networks created by our model
can be mapped to particular forms of payoff matrices. Consequently, social structure can act as a
measurable metric for social games which in turn allows us to provide a game theoretical perspective
on online political debates.
INTRODUCTION
Fixed resources drive competition and non-linear dy-
namics in socio-biological systems[1–8]. As entities com-
pete over resources, they often face strategic decisions:
pursuing one resource means foregoing another. The im-
portance of such strategic decisions is exacerbated when
resources are heterogeneous because some are ultimately
more valuable than others. Many real world scenarios
feature heterogeneous resources where strategic decisions
determine the winner of the competition. For exam-
ple, consider political campaigns, a canonical example
of social competition where voters identify with one of
many candidates and either try to change or reinforce
the opinions of other voters. A typical strategic decision
is how much time to spend debating with adversaries
so as to change their opinions versus agreeing with like-
minded voters. Recent studies of online conversations
provide unique insights into this process [9–12]. Barbera´
et al. studied 150 million tweets on Twitter to deter-
mine how often online political discussions were debates
as opposed to echo chambers where like-minded people
voice a shared opinion [12]. Their results, reproduced on
Fig. 1, demonstrate how users with different ideologies
behave in characteristic manners. More specifically, they
found that users identified as liberals are more likely to
initiate cross-ideological conversations on political issues
than users identified as conservatives. Similar differences
in strategy between people of different ideologies have
also been observed in other online discussion forums [9]
∗ Correspondence to: elibby@santafe.edu
including user comments on online newspapers [11]. Mo-
tivated by these examples, we consider a general model
of competition between different strategies.
Classical models of competitor dynamics on networks,
such as the voter model (VM) [13] and the analogous
Moran process model (MP) [14], do not distinguish be-
tween resources in a way that permits consideration of
strategic tradeoffs. Indeed, each competitor in an MP is
defined by a single parameter that expresses their abil-
ity to indiscriminately obtain available resources. Simi-
larly, a VM typically considers a fixed symmetric social
structure (i.e. with undirected interactions) and the in-
fluence of a voter over its neighbours does not depend
on their current state. The lack of state-dependent in-
teractions is particularly limiting because resources will
likely change hands, or states. As this happens, com-
petitors may want to modify interactions to reclaim or
protect resources. In the context of the earlier political
example, when nodes change states they adopt differ-
ent opinions/ideologies and thus probably change their
strategies accordingly. Adaptive networks, where links
(or their weights) change with the states of nodes, offer
a natural way to model this plasticity. This rewiring al-
lows strategies to determine both which nodes interact
and how they interact, depending on their states.
Using the directed stochastic block model (SBM) to en-
code these strategies [15], we extend the MP and VM dy-
namics to an adaptive network structure to study the ef-
fects of strategic decisions. We obtain general analytical
solutions for the voter model dynamics and investigate
specific cases with tradeoffs between aggressiveness and
defensiveness (i.e., targeting adversaries vs. targeting
like-minded individuals). We show that these tradeoffs
yield interesting, and even paradoxical, behaviors such as
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FIG. 1. Debates and echo chambers on Twitter. Shown is the number of retweets according to the inferred ideologies
of the author and of the retweeter. The ideology of authors is estimated through their connections and ranges from strongly
liberal (-3) to strongly conservative (+3). Political subjects such as the federal budget and marriage equality in the USA (left
and middle panels respectively) lead to a much stronger homophily and the creation of echo chambers, while non-political
subjects such as the 2014 Winter Olympics (right panel) are not polarized. Reproduced from Ref. [12].
long transient dynamics, sensitive dependence to initial
conditions, and non-transitive dynamics. These results
are reminiscent of classic voting paradoxes and are known
results from evolutionary game theory; in fact, the SBM
allows us to directly map the social structure created by
our model to particular cases of payoff matrices in game
theory. While the mapping between the two models is
not exact, we observe several interesting results of well-
mixed game theory in our network model. This means
on the one hand that our model can provide a network
perspective to game theory, and on the other hand that
social network structure can potentially be used to infer
the payoff structure of an equivalent evolutionary game.
For example, we show how we can use our model to infer
different dynamical regimes from empirical observations
of activities on Twitter and interpret the resulting net-
work structure as a signature of competitor strategies.
RESULTS
We consider competitor dynamics on an adaptive net-
work where nodes are units of resource adopting a state
according to which of the g competitors currently claims
them. The interactions between the nodes depend on
their states and are prescribed by the g × g matrix P
whose elements pij correspond to the probability that a
directed link exists from a node of state i towards a node
of state j. As in the traditional voter model, at every time
step a randomly chosen node adopts the state of a node
at the end of a randomly chosen incoming link. In this
adaptive version, once a node changes state its incoming
and outgoing edges are redrawn according to P reflect-
ing its new state. Thus, the network evolves throughout
the competition as nodes change hands. Other versions
of adaptive coevolution of structure and voter dynamics
exist [16–18] but, to the best of our knowledge, all involve
symmetric strategies across competitors.
Here, the density matrix P is not only a description
of the underlying structure at a given time, but directly
reflects the different strategies of different competitors.
For instance, a modular structure (i.e., larger pij val-
ues on the diagonal or homophily) implies defensive or
self-reinforcing strategies that try to prevent their nodes
from switching to a different state. A fuzzy multipartite
structure (i.e., larger pij values off the diagonal or het-
erophily) reflects offensive strategies where individuals
mostly target competitors. Similarly, a core-periphery
structure [19] reflects a defensive competitor facing an
offensive strategy (i.e., one row showing homophily and
others rows showing heterophily). Our model can there-
fore lead to very different network structures arising from
the interplay between strategies. In fact, the network
structure is entirely specified by P which in turn is a di-
rect parametrization of the strategies of the competitors.
Without any constraints on the density matrix P , the
optimal strategy for nodes belonging to competitor i
would be to fully target every state, i.e. pij = 1 ∀j. How-
ever, to embody the key tradeoffs mentioned in the in-
troduction, an obvious choice of constraints is pii+pij =
1 ∀j 6= i, which forces competitors to choose between
offense (targeting competitor-owned nodes) and defense
(targeting self-owned nodes). We analyze the resulting
dynamics for two competitors trying to capture a major-
ity of nodes and find that there exists a single optimal
strategy. In contrast, the presence of a third competitor
results in much richer dynamics. We discover that there
are four canonical types of dynamics for three competi-
3tors that can exhibit counterintuitive, nonlinear behav-
iors.
The two competitor case
We begin our analysis of competitor dynamics on an
adaptive network by considering a reduced form of the
general framework where there are only two competitors
who both face the same constraint pi1 + pi2 = 1 on their
possible strategies. The matrix P thus has the structure
P =
(
p1 1− p1
1− p2 p2
)
, (1)
where 0 ≤ p1, p2 ≤ 1 are the parameters that define each
strategy. The value of pi determines how much competi-
tor i influences itself, i.e., defending its own resources,
while 1− pi is the influence on the opposing competitor.
Since the total influence of any competitor is constrained,
there is a trade-off between group cohesion pi (i.e., de-
fense) and the deployment of effort to gather new nodes
1− pi (i.e., offense). The success of a competitor is mea-
sured by its frequency in the population, which we denote
xi. The frequencies xi range from 0 to 1, and only one
of them is needed to fully specify the state of a system
with 2 competitors since the other is constrained by the
conserved population:
∑
i xi = 1.
Using Eq. (1) and the conservation relation x2 = 1−x1,
we can describe the change in frequency of competitor 1,
whose strategy is determined by p1, by
x˙1 =
x1(1− x1)(1− p1)
x1(1− p1) + (1− x1)p2 −
x1(1− x1)(1− p2)
x1p1 + (1− x1)(1− p2) .
(2)
The first term corresponds to nodes belonging to com-
petitor 1 trying to claim the remaining 1 − x1 fraction
of nodes. The probability that an offense on a given
node of competitor 2 is successful is given by the ratio of
edges from competitor 1 [x1(1 − p1)] to the total num-
ber of incoming edges on that node [offense plus defense:
x1(1 − p1) + (1 − x1)p2]. The second term correspond
to nodes of competitor 1 being claimed by nodes of com-
petitor 2, and is constructed using the same logic.
The three fixed points of Eq. (2) are
x
∗(1)
1 = 0 , x
∗(2)
1 = 1 and
x
∗(3)
1 = (1− p2) / (2− p1 − p2) . (3)
Analyzing the stability of the fixed points, we find that
there are two qualitative regimes depending on the value
of p1 + p2 (see Supplementary Methods for analysis). If
p1+p2 < 1, both x
∗(1)
1 and x
∗(2)
1 are unstable and x
∗(3)
1 is
stable. This means that the competition will result in a
mixed population where neither competitor goes extinct.
The competitor who has the highest value of p will make
up the majority of the population. In contrast, if p1 +
p2 > 1, then both x
∗(1)
1 and x
∗(2)
1 are stable and x
∗(3)
1 is
unstable. Thus, one competitor will always go extinct.
The winner does not depend on strategy but rather the
initial frequency. If x1(0) is greater than x
∗(3)
1 then x1
will win; if x1(0) is less than x
∗(3)
1 then x1 will go extinct.
Our stability analysis shows that coexistence is only
possible if competitors adopt sufficiently offensive strate-
gies, i.e. p1 + p2 < 1. We call such competitions “pair-
wise aggressive” because each competitor’s offense over-
whelms the defense of their opponent, i.e. p1 < 1 − p2
and p2 < 1 − p1. In Fig. 2, an example of a pairwise
aggressive competition shows that as the two strategies
compete for resources they shape the network topology
into a disassortative structure: nodes of one competitor
preferentially target nodes of the other competitor. In
contrast, a competition in which p1 +p2 > 1 results in an
assortative network. We call such competitions “pairwise
defensive” because each competitor’s defense is greater
than the offense of their opponent. The ultimate result
of a pairwise defensive competition is annihilation of one
of the competitors (see also Fig. 2).
This result is surprising when we consider the under-
lying network architecture. When both strategies are
defensive (high pi for all i), the assortative network has
a highly modular structure which indicates poorly cou-
pled subsystems occupied by different competitors. This
would seem to promote coexistence as it is analogous
to each competitor having a well-defined territory and
rarely seeking to acquire outside nodes. Yet, this struc-
ture promotes extinction. This occurs due to a positive
feedback mechanism: once a competitor loses a node, its
opponent’s territory grows because of the adaptive struc-
ture. This node is now more strongly defended because
it is part of a larger module, and thus harder to recap-
ture. This feedback destabilizes coexistence. Similarly,
we might expect the well-mixed system architecture of
the low p strategy competition to allow for one competi-
tor to rapidly capture all the nodes, but our results show
the opposite.
Finally, we find that the two-competitor system has
the optimal strategy p = 1/2, although the ultimate out-
come may depend on the initial resources of the competi-
tors. If both competitors start with the same resources
x1(0) = x2(0) = 1/2, then the strategy p = 1/2 is un-
beatable: it guarantees a win against all p 6= 1/2. Note
that a competitor who values survival instead of winning
by majority may prefer the strategy p = 0, which guar-
antees a nonzero equilibrium population for all nonzero
initial conditions.
Evolutionary game theory perspective
One striking aspect of the solutions shown in Eq. 3 is
that their phenomenology is surprisingly reminiscent of
the solutions of a 2-strategy game in an infinite and well-
mixed population. Consider the classic example of the
2-player, 2-strategy prisoner’s dilemma. At every step,
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FIG. 2. Examples of a two competitor contest with assortative and disassortative strategies. We illustrate
topologies given two set of strategies. Node color corresponds to its current state, node size is proportional to its total degree,
and links are colored according to the states of the nodes they connect. (left) A disassortative structure: nodes tend to connect
to nodes of a different state, notice that most links are grey which denotes inter block links. (right) An assortative structure:
nodes tend to connect to nodes of the same state. (bottom) Time evolution of the voter model on these adaptive topologies. In
the disassortative structure both competitors can coexist whereas the assortative structure leads to a winner-takes-all scenario.
two individuals in an infinite population are chosen at
random. Each individual must choose to either collabo-
rate or defect. If both collaborate, they are awarded a
big payoff R as a reward. If they both defect, they are
awarded a small payoff P as punishment. If one defects
and one collaborates, they respectively get the tempta-
tion award T and sucker punishment S. The game is
thus fully parametrized by the following award (or pay-
off) matrix A:
A =
(
R S
T P
)
, (4)
where Aij corresponds to the award given to a node in
state i interacting with a node in state j. State i =
1 corresponds to cooperation and is awarded either R
(j = 1) or S (j = 2), and state i = 2 corresponds to
defection and is awarded either T (j = 1) or P (j = 2).
Following the presentation in Ref. [20], we denote the
frequency of strategy i in the infinite population as yi.
Its expected award is therefore fi =
∑
j yjAij , and the
expected award of any random individual is α =
∑
i yifi.
Under the assumption that the frequency of a strategy
is proportional to its expected award, we can write the
following mean-field dynamics:
y˙i = yi(fi − α) , (5)
whose fixed points are
y
∗(1)
1 = 0 , y
∗(2)
1 = 1 and
y
∗(3)
1 = (P − S) / (R− S − T + P ) . (6)
The phenomenology of the prisoner’s dilemma is thus
very similar to that of our model: 2 fixed points corre-
sponding to winner-takes-all scenarios, and a co-existence
fixed point. In the general case without strategic trade-
offs (see Supplementary Methods for a complete analy-
sis), we can set T = S = p12 = p21 6= 0 to force symmetry
between the two strategies and avoid disconnected sub-
populations. There is then a direct mapping between all
fixed points when A = P .
This condition is not surprising since, unlike the pris-
oner’s dilemma, the voter model does not allow one strat-
egy to have an advantage over the other (i.e., a node
converts its neighbour with a probability independent of
their types; the outcome only depends on the relative
number of neighbours of each type). The other key differ-
ence in the general forms of the two models is that ours
includes network effects that co-evolve with the states
of the nodes. A simple example from the mapping de-
scribed above is when p12 = p21 = 0, where there are no
dynamics whatsoever in the voter model since the two
populations are disconnected; it is of course not the case
5for the well-mixed prisoner’s dilemma even if T = S = 0.
There is a also a more subtle but fundamental dis-
tinction between the two models. In classic evolution-
ary game theory there are pairwise interactions between
players where the payoff matrix determines who wins and
thereby increases in relative frequency. The strategies
adopted by players and the associated payoff matrices
can only be inferred through population dynamics [21].
In contrast, in our model, the network structure (i.e., the
directions and densities of the various edges) is shaped
by and reflects the competing strategies at any point in
time. As a consequence the competition and its dynamics
can be inferred from a static snapshot of the network.
Despite these differences, there is striking similarity
between the phenomenology observed in our model and
in g-strategies game theory. This is likely due to the
fact that the underlying dynamics in both models is de-
termined by a term corresponding to the probability of
interaction between two strategies and the associated re-
ward/influence. In the following section we will consider
the case of three competitors and their rich dynamical
behaviours that can also be found in results of evolution-
ary game theory, but that emerge here for very different
reasons. In fact, it will be much easier to interpret our
results, and the tradeoffs from which they stem, in terms
of the structure of the interaction network. In that sense,
one significant advantage of our model is that the density
matrix P is much less abstract than the payoff matrix
A in the sense that it can be measured from relatively
simple data. This network perspective thus allows us to
apply our model to the previously discussed Twitter data
(cf., end of the section and Fig. 8).
The three competitor case
Having analyzed the case of two competitors, we now
investigate the case of three competitors each trying to
collect more nodes than the others. We assume for sim-
plicity that competitors adopt the same strategy against
all of their opponents. Thus, there is no distinction be-
tween opposition, only an “us and them” distinction.
The constraints remain the same in that each competi-
tor allocates a proportion pi of its strategy to reinforcing
captured nodes, and the remaining 1 − pi to pursuing
nodes owned by its competitors. The elements pij of the
matrix P have the form
P =
 p1 1− p1 1− p11− p2 p2 1− p2
1− p3 1− p3 p3
 , (7)
and the dynamics can be followed by equations of the
form
x˙i = xi
∑
j∈{1,2,3}
[
pijxj∑
l∈{1,2,3} pljxl
− pjixj∑
l∈{1,2,3} plixl
]
,
(8)
for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, although one is superfluous as the
system is constrained by x1 + x2 + x3 = 1.
In the two-competitor scenario, the optimal strategy
was p = 1/2. For example, if a competitor with this op-
timal strategy battled an opponent with p < 1/2, then
the competition would finish with a mixed population
where p = 1/2 held the majority. If, instead, the com-
petitor with the optimal strategy battled two opponents
each with a p < 1/2 then it would go extinct (see Fig. 3).
Thus, the p = 1/2 strategy is not optimal in the three-
competitor scenario.
To analyze the dynamics of the three-competitor con-
test, we note that setting any xi = 0 constrains the
phase space of the dynamics to the set of the remaining
two competitors. Consequently, the results for the two-
competitor contest apply directly to the three-competitor
case. This yields six fixed points: three in which only one
competitor exists and three mixed states with two com-
petitors. There is another possible set of fixed points
corresponding to coexistence of all three competitors,
i.e., x∗1, x
∗
2, x
∗
3 6= 0. We find that barring pathological
cases, there can only exist at most one fixed point where
all three competitors coexist (see Supplementary Meth-
ods). We can obtain this fixed point by removing the
xi factor in all x˙i = 0 equations to eliminate solutions
with any x∗i = 0. Through a simple change of variables
zi = x
∗
i /
(∑
j pjix
∗
j
)
, the resulting system of equations
can be written as the matrix equation
P~z = ~1, (9)
where ~z is the vector of the new zi variables. The change
of variables allows us to leverage the symmetries of the
original equations. We can compute the remaining fixed
point with three non-zero stable competitors by inverting
P and solving a system of linear equations.
By computing the fixed points and determining their
stabilities, we find that the three-competitor contest can
be described by a set of five characteristic flow diagrams
that we organize into four classes with qualitatively dif-
ferent behaviors and numbers/types of stable outcomes.
Each class is distinguished by two simple features: (i)
by the number of defensive strategies, i.e. how many
competitors i ∈ 1, 2, 3 have pi ≥ 1/2; and (ii) by the
number of pairwise combination of strategies that are
generally defensive, i.e., whether pi + pj is greater than
1 for pairings {i, j} in {1, 2}, {1, 3} and {2, 3}. Condi-
tion (ii) determines the dynamics along the edge of the
~x space (where xi = 0 for exactly one i), and condition
(i) informs us on the overall shape of the flow. In what
follows, we discuss the dynamics of each class and its im-
plications for three-competitor contests. We analyse the
observed phenomenology in terms of the underlying net-
work structure, but similar discussions exist for games
with more than two strategies in evolutionary game the-
ory [22, 23]
Interior stable fixed point. We already know that pair-
wise aggressive competitions promote coexistence in two-
competitor cases. Similarly, with three competitors, all
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FIG. 3. Dynamical trajectories for competitor using strategies p1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.4, and p3 = 0.3. (left) This triangle
contains all possible dynamics: we show trajectories through a space where every point is defined by a unique (x1, x2, x3) state.
Therefore, any point within the triangle correspond to a mixed state where all competitors have non-zero frequencies, whereas
the edges correspond to two-competitor dynamics. All stable fixed points are shown as black dots, and semi-stable and unstable
fixed points appear as open circles (their stability can also be deduced by the linear flows shown in black arrows around them).
We delineate the three regions corresponding to states where one of the three competitors are respectively winning by a relative
majority. While competitor 1 uses p1 = 0.5, which is optimal on a one-on-one basis as shown by the two fixed points close
to the (1, 0, 0) apex, it systematically loses when all three strategies are involved. (middle) Example of a time series starting
at (0.099, 0.002, 0.899), which corresponds to the one highlighted in the left figure. (right) The network structure when two
strategies are aggressive and one is defensive corresponds to a core-periphery structure with the core corresponding to the
highest p value. The network display style is the same as used in Fig. 2. The core is denser with nodes having a higher average
total degree, but it does not target the periphery whereas nodes on the periphery preferentially targets the core and eventually
win.
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FIG. 4. Coexistence of three aggressive strategies.
Depicted is the flow diagram of the voter dynamics given
p1 = 0.3, p2 = 0.2 and p3 = 0.1. As obtained through our
analysis of the two competitor dynamics, aggressive strategies
promote coexistence. This is generalized in the three competi-
tor cases, where an interior stable fixed point can exist when
pi < 1/2 for all i.
three strategies can coexist only when all strategies are
offensive, i.e. pi < 1/2 ∀i. This mixed fixed point is glob-
ally stable such that all trajectories lead to it provided
that the frequencies of competitors are nonzero (see Fig. 4
for example). As a result, if two competitors have reached
their equilibrium and a third competitor enters the con-
test at low abundance then the equilibrium is shifted to
the interior fixed point. Thus, any third competitor with
a strategy of p < 1/2 can successfully invade and reach
a nonzero equilibrium frequency in the population. Fol-
lowing the results of Ref. [23] and knowing that the basic
step of the voter model is a pairwise interaction (i.e., a
two-player game), we know that there is only a single
point of full co-existence.
Single edge stable fixed point. Another class of flow
diagrams have a single final state in which two competi-
tors coexist and one goes extinct. This occurs if only
one strategy is defensive, i.e. pi ≥ 1/2 for only one
i, which disrupts the fully mixed coexistence. In these
cases, all trajectories with nonzero initial conditions lead
to a fixed point corresponding to coexistence between the
two offensive strategies. This class of flow diagrams has
an interesting property that in some cases the winner of
pairwise competitions is the loser in the three competitor
contest (see Fig. 3 for an example of this behavior). This
“winner turns loser” scenario is analogous to well-known
paradoxes in voting systems with rational voters choos-
ing between options [24]. To be clear, our results and
methodology are distinct from the traditional framing of
voter paradoxes. In such systems, there are rational vot-
ers choosing between options and voters have fixed pref-
erences for the options. Various rules used to determine
the winning option present paradoxical behavior. In our
system, the analogous framing would be if nodes are vot-
ers and competitors are options. But since the networks
we analyze are adaptive, voters are continually chang-
ing their preference for options. Despite the differences,
the winner turns loser paradox emerges in our system
through the existence of a stable fixed point between the
pairwise “losing” strategies.
Two stable fixed points. There are two classes of com-
petitions with two stable outcomes: either two stable
mixed points where two strategies coexist, or one sta-
7ble mixed point and one stable winner-takes-all outcome.
The former occurs when we have two defensive strate-
gies but only one pairwise defensive combination. In this
case, the two pairwise defensive match-ups will lead to
two stable mixed points where the most aggressive strat-
egy coexist with either of the defensive strategies. The
second case with two stable points, which has one sta-
ble mixed state and one stable winner-takes-all outcome,
occurs when there are two pairwise defensive match-ups.
Obviously, the pairwise aggressive pair will still lead to a
stable mixed state, but the two pairwise defensive pairs
create unstable fixed points that delineate a basin of at-
traction for initial conditions leading to a winner-takes-
all outcome for the most defensive strategy.
This class of flow diagrams contains trajectories in
which a competitor approaches close to extinction before
increasing to reach the majority of the population. These
long transients appear to approach one stable set of fixed
points before passing a critical threshold where the be-
havior rapidly changes (see Fig. 5). Interestingly, these
trajectories also pass through areas in which one com-
petitor is close to obtaining all of the nodes before even-
tually losing a majority of them. This type of paradoxical
behaviour, where an initial decrease in the frequency of
a competitor eventually leads to an enhancement of the
same competitor, were originally observed in dynamics
with cyclical dominance built-in the game structure (e.g.
rock-paper-scissors) [25]. In our case it emerges because
the winner of the pairwise match-ups can not simulta-
neously overcome two competitors with high frequencies,
and must instead wait for one to be suppressed before
taking over. A similar effect can also be caused by spa-
tial constraints on predator-prey dynamics [26].
Three stable fixed points. Finally, when all pairings are
defensive, then there are three stable fixed points corre-
sponding to complete dominance by one competitor. In
these competitions, there is no coexistence. The basins
of attraction for the fixed points share borders such that
small changes in initial conditions can completely change
the outcome (see Fig. 6). The largest basin of attraction
belongs to the competitor with the least defensive strat-
egy, i.e., the lowest p. Note that only in contests between
three defensive strategies, i.e. pi ≥ 1/2 ∀i, do we see an
interior unstable fixed point as in Fig. 6.
Generalized model and empirically-derived P matrix
Hithereto, we primarily considered particular strategic
tradeoffs between offense and defense, but our framework
is much more general. Competitors may distinguish be-
tween different opponents and split their offensive efforts.
For instance, consider the following strategy matrix
P =
0.33 0.32 0.350.35 0.33 0.32
0.32 0.35 0.33
 , (10)
in which we have built a cyclical structure. Competi-
tor 1 targets competitor 3 preferentially, competitor 2
targets competitor 1, and competitor 3 targets competi-
tor 2. Even though the preferential targeting is small,
there is enough asymmetry to push the system towards
cyclical Rock-Paper-Scissor dynamics as shown in Fig. 7.
This kind of behavior has been well-studied [27–30] and
is easily generated when competitors distinguish between
opposition. Although the trajectories that lead to the fi-
nal steady state can be very different, the final solutions
derived in our analysis (see Supplementary Methods) still
holds and can apply to an arbitrary number of competi-
tors.
To illustrate how one might apply our general frame-
work to real world scenarios, we revisit the empirical data
from Twitter on political discussions presented in Fig. 1.
The echo chambers observed in the political discussions
imply that users are following defensive strategies, in
which they devote more of their effort to like-minded
users than users with opposing views. The shape of the
data suggests a parametrization in terms of three ideolo-
gies: liberal, centrist, and conservative. Coarse-graining
the empirical matrix in terms of this parametrization di-
rectly gives a P matrix for its competitor dynamics. Fig-
ure 8 summarizes the prediction of our model based on
this empirical P matrix. As expected from the defen-
sive strategies and our previous analysis, the dynamical
system finds itself in a regime sensitive to initial condi-
tions with possibly long transient behavior. Uncertainty
in initial conditions is thus not only reflected in terms of
which competitor ultimately wins, but also potentially in
how long it will take before a winner emerges.
Figure 8 shows how our model incorporates empiri-
cal data when each competitor can distinguish between
opposing competitors. In such cases, the extinction of
one competitor does not reduce the competition to an
equivalent two-competitor scenario. Indeed, in Figure 8
after the centrist ideology falls to zero, conservatives have
higher outgoing degree than liberals as liberals waste
edges targeting non-existent centrists. Re-scaling strate-
gies to account for the disappearance of a competitor can
lead to a completely different outcome, see dotted curves
on Fig. 8. Assuming the competitors are informed of the
current state of the system, this opens the door for more
complex strategies that would themselves adaptively co-
evolve with the population.
DISCUSSION
There is a rich history in both biology and social sci-
ences of mathematical models used to understand the
dynamics of competition over finite resources [1–8]. The
canonical class of these models, which include voter mod-
els and Moran processes, do not incorporate characteris-
tic features of many real-world competitions. Motivated
by empirical data from Twitter and other online forums,
we extend these models by adding three features: 1. com-
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FIG. 5. Long transient behavior with mixed strategies. (left) We compute the flow diagram using p1 = 0.8, p2 = 0.5
and p3 = 0.2. Notice that the pairwise competition of competitor 1 and 3 leads to a line of fixed points on the right edge of the
simplex because of the pathological case p1 = 1 − p3, see Supplementary Methods for details.(right) Example of a time series
where the final winner (p2) stays close to extinction until competitor 3 obtains a majority.
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FIG. 6. Dynamical trajectories in a modular competition between p1 = 0.9, p2 = 0.8, and p3 = 0.7. (left) Example
of a network built from three defensive strategies leads to three distinct modules. The network display style is the same as used
in Fig. 2. (middle) Flow diagram of the voter model dynamics given these three defensive strategies shows the three basins
of attractions. (right) Example of two time series with slightly different initial conditions shows how the final outcomes of the
competition can change. The one with full markers starts at (0.62, 0.28, 0.1) and the one shown with a dotted line starts at
(0.61, 0.29, 0.1).
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FIG. 7. Rock-paper-scissor behavior in a well-mixed system with slight asymmetries. (left) The network architecture
is well-mixed (i.e. an homogeneous network) as the asymmetries in density between groups are of the order of 1 in a 100 links.
The network display style is the same as used in Fig. 2. (middle) The flow diagram resulting from the P matrix in Eq. (10)
shows cyclic behavior. (right) The slight cyclical structure (1 targets 3, 2 targets 1 and 3 targets 2) is enough to give rise to
damped cyclical behavior. Note that an asymmetry in the initial conditions is also needed. The stronger the asymmetries, the
longer the oscillatory transient would be.
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FIG. 8. Application of our model to Twitter data. (left) Shown are strategies of retweets for different inferred ideologies of
authors, according to (and normalized) for every inferred ideologies of retweeters using the federal budget data. The structure
of strategies leads to a natural parametrization in terms of three ideologies showed by dotted lines: liberal (smaller than
-1.0), centrist (between -1.0 and 1.0) and conservative (above 1.0). Coarse-graining of retweets over this 3 by 3 matrix, then
normalizing per row, leads directly to a possible P matrix. (middle) We obtain P matrix and compute the flow diagram with
our general analysis (see Supplementary Methods). We highlight two possible time series to illustrate how small changes in
initial conditions can lead to drastically different outcomes. (right) One possible time series (highlighted in solid line on the flow
diagram) shows the transient behavior. The dotted curves do not exactly correspond to the dotted curve in the flow diagram,
but rather to a scenario where strategies are re-scaled (or re-normalized) to remove the centrist ideology from the system once
its frequency falls below 1% of the population.
petitors can adopt different strategies towards resources
they control and those they do not, 2. there is a tradeoff
between offense (seeking resources to acquire) and de-
fense (protecting resources in possession), and 3. the
competition structure adapts according to the interplay
between strategies.
In competitions between two competitors there is a
single optimal strategy that invests equally in defense
and offense. The addition of another competitor cre-
ates a much richer set of dynamics with four qualitative
regimes. One immediate consequence is the absence of
an optimal strategy. The different regimes in the three-
competitor case exhibit behavior observed in real-world
competitions, including winner-turn-loser paradoxes and
instances where the ultimate winning competitors must
first past close to extinction.
When there are three competitors, coexistence can
only occur if all competitors adopt primarily offensive
strategies. When competitors adopt defensive strategies,
they promote winner-takes-all outcomes. This outcome
is surprising considering the network structure that re-
sults from such competitions. Defensive strategies lead
to high modularity in which each competitor acquires
a set of resources/nodes and forms many links between
the nodes in order to maintain possession. This network
structure seems like it would lead to coexistence because
each competitor protects a set of nodes and makes lit-
tle effort to acquire others. However, it is precisely this
structure that leads to the extinction of one or two com-
petitors. The main reason is that there is a strong posi-
tive feedback loop, where once there is a disparity in the
number of nodes belonging to each competitor, the ma-
jority owner is more likely to acquire new nodes even if it
spends little effort trying to do so. In contrast, a compe-
tition with only offensive strategies produces a network
structure in which nodes are continually changing hands.
Although this structure seems unstable, the average num-
ber of nodes possessed by competitors reaches a non-zero
steady state, i.e. coexistence.
If we consider the competitor who claims the most
nodes/resources to be the winner, then we find that the
optimal strategy in the two-competitor case can easily be
out-competed in the three-competitor case. Namely, the
p = 1/2 strategy beats an either more offensive or defen-
sive strategy, but loses when facing two offensive or de-
fensive competitors. Instead the strategy with a value of
P in between the others tends to win. The best strategy,
therefore, is to be the second most aggressive competitor.
Thus, the best strategy for a given competitor depends
on the strategies adopted by the other competitors.
The dependence of the winning strategy on the com-
peting strategies gives rise to well-known voting para-
doxes. For example Fig. 3 illustrates the Condorcet Win-
ner and the Violation of the subset choice condition para-
doxes (CW and SCC), which are some of the most fre-
quently occurring paradoxes [24]. The CW paradox oc-
curs when a competitor loses an election despite the fact
that it would be preferred over any of the competing
alternatives. In our model, this occurs in competitions
between offensive strategies. On a one-on-one basis the
strategy closest to p = 1/2 would win, but it is the middle
strategy that wins in three-competitor scenarios. So, for
example, in a competition between p1 = 1/2, p2 = 1/3,
and p3 = 1/4, the p1 strategy would win any pairwise
competition but the p2 strategy would win in the three
competitor case. This dynamic also implies the SCC
paradox in which the expected winner of an election may
eventually lose following the removal of a current loser.
Indeed, the second most offensive strategy is expected to
win if all competitors are present, but loses if the most
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offensive strategy is removed. The inverse of this behav-
ior which also exists in our model system is the decoy
or asymmetric dominance effect [31] whereby introduc-
ing an inferior option/competitor can artificially promote
another option/competitor, even if it was not an initial
favorite. Interestingly, these paradoxes were primarily
identified in social choice systems with very different fea-
tures than exist in our model. Yet, we find similar para-
doxes are produced by the interplay between strategic
tradeoffs and adaptive network structure, without the
need for any active choice.
Another interesting feature found in our model is the
existence of extremely long transient dynamics. An ex-
ample displayed in Fig. 5 shows that an eventual winner
passes very close to zero frequency in the population cor-
responding to extinction or complete loss. Interestingly,
the competitor who was leading initially ends up going
extinct. If mid-competition we were to remove the even-
tual winner, then the initially leading competitor would
win. These long dynamics have important implications
when we consider political campaigns. A political cam-
paign that steadily decreased in the polls until it claimed
only a small percentage of support would generally be
assumed to be a lost cause. Yet in our simple model,
such a campaign may simply be following a long tran-
sient and may ultimately win despite its seeming initial
failure. We note that strategies in our model are fixed so
that if a campaign with the long transient wins, it is not
due to any strategic shift or adjustment.
We also note that the competitions analyzed in our
paper are not just decided by strategy but also by initial
conditions. In fact, the expected dynamics and eventual
winner can be extremely sensitive to initial conditions.
For example, if all competitors adopt defensive strategies
then there are three stable fixed points corresponding to
the three different winner-takes-all outcomes. Each sta-
ble fixed point has its own basin of attraction separated
by unstable fixed points. One of these unstable fixed
points corresponds to an initial condition where all three
competitors are initially present. As observed in Fig. 6,
small deviations around this point push the dynamics to
any of the three winner-takes-all outcome.
In this paper, we highlighted many similarities between
our results and evolutionary game theory. These likely
stem from the fact that in both cases strategies inter-
act according to probabilities and there is a resultant
payout or reward. While the underlying dynamics share
similar elements, there are larger conceptual differences.
Our model features an adaptive network structure which
means that, at any time, the network encodes the strate-
gies. One can look at a node and observe the outgoing
and ingoing edges to infer the P matrix and compute the
subsequent dynamics—as we did in our Twitter analysis.
In contrast, classic evolutionary game theory often does
not include any population structure apart from relative
frequencies of players (and those that do often consider
fixed structures). As a result, in order to determine the
competition dynamics one must know the payoff matrix
and the probabilities that certain strategies are played.
This data is typically hidden from view in empirical sys-
tems and challenging to infer without population dynam-
ics. Thus, despite the qualitative connection observed be-
tween the payoff structure of game theory and the con-
nectivity structure of our adaptive networks, empirical
analysis is likely more readily accessible using our con-
ceptualization and approach.
Finally, our analysis focused on a particular type of
tradeoff but it is certainly not the only one. For example,
the Twitter data we used to fit a P matrix did not follow
that particular tradeoff. Nonetheless, our general analy-
sis still holds and we found similar qualitative dynamics
as observed in our more restricted three competitor case.
There are, of course, many caveats involved in the use
of online discussion forum data, and it might be that in-
corporating data from other sources such as Facebook or
Reddit might yield different P matrix structures. Al-
though individuals have access to many online platforms
and activities, their behaviors are likely correlated with
their ideology. Consequently, interpreting the data from
online discussion platforms is an active area of research
[11, 12, 32]. Our mathematical model complements this
work by providing a simple parametrization concerning
offense/defense strategies that can be tuned to multiple
data sources. Not only does it exhibit behavior found in
complex real world scenarios but there are many interest-
ing open questions. For example, do defensive strategies
really lead to winner-takes-all competitions while offen-
sive strategies promote coexistence of competitors/ideas?
Do the qualitative dynamics change if competitors face
different constraints? What happens if competitors alter
their strategies over the course of the competition? At
the very least, our analytical results provide examples of
what to look for in further study.
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This document provides a full analysis of the model described in the main text. We provide general mean-field
equations for the dynamics in which an arbitrary number of competitors are at play. We describe all possible outcomes
of the case with two competitors, and solve all fixed points of the dynamics in the case with an arbitrary number of
competitors. We also reproduce the full data from Ref. [13] in main text, use them to estimate our model parameters
and produce the corresponding flow diagrams.
I. GENERAL FORMULATION OF THE MODEL
We consider a population of N nodes belonging at any given time to one of a set of different competitors, noted
G. At time t, Ni(t) nodes belong to competitor i ∈ G during the interval [t, t + dt). The interactions between the
nodes are prescribed by the directed stochastic block model specified by the matrix P whose elements pij correspond
to the probability that a directed link exists from a node of state i towards a node of state j. Nodes continuously
change hands by randomly switching to the state of one of the nodes that have a directed link pointing to them (i.e.,
incoming link). Hence, at any time t, a node of state i has kinij (t) incoming links from nodes of state j with probability
Pr[kinij (t) = n] =
(
Nj(t)
n
)
pnji(1− pji)Nj(t)−n , (1)
and opts for state j with a probability kinij (t)/
∑
l∈G k
in
il (t). Once a node has changed state, its incoming and outgoing
links are redrawn according to the matrix P . Note that nodes may stick to their current state since self-loops are
allowed (i.e., stubbornness) and incoming links may be from nodes sharing the same state (i.e., group cohesion).
Let us now state the general mean-field equations to follow the dynamics in the limit of an infinite population being
disputed by a set G of different competitors. To do so, we consider an annealed version of the model in which links
are continuously redrawn according to matrix P regardless of whether nodes change their state or not, and this is
achieved at a rate faster than the process of switching states itself (i.e., there is no temporal correlation). We also
consider the limit N → ∞ and define xi(t) = Ni(t)/N as the fraction of nodes sharing state i. Note that we will
explicitly write the time dependency only if required to avoid confusion. A node of state i has a number of incoming
links from nodes of state j proportional to pjixj , and switched its state to j at a rate proportional to pjixj/
∑
l∈G plixl.
Altogether, the time evolution of the system is described by the following differential equation
x˙i = xi
∑
j
xj
(
pijϕj − pjiϕi
) ∀ i ∈ G (2)
where the elements of the matrix P , {pij}i,j∈G , are the probability that a directed link exists from a node of competitor
j towards a node of competitor i, and where ϕj is the reciprocal of the expected in-degree of nodes of competitor j
ϕj =
1∑
l pljxl
. (3)
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2We can readily compute the elements of the Jacobian matrix from which the stability of the fixed points of Eq. (2)
can be determined
Jki =
∂x˙k
∂xi
= xk
∑
j
∂xj
∂xi
(
pkjϕj − pjkϕk
)
+
∂xk
∂xi
∑
j
xj
(
pkjϕj − pjkϕk
)
+ xk
∑
j
xj
(
pkj
∂ϕj
∂xi
− pjk ∂ϕk
∂xi
)
= xk
(
pkiϕi − pikϕk
)
+ δik
∑
j
xj
(
pkjϕj − pjkϕk
)
+ xk
∑
j
xj
(
pjkpikϕ
2
k − pkjpijϕ2j
)
. (4)
Let us finally rewrite Eq. (2) in a way that will be useful in the subsequent analysis.
x˙k = xk
∑
j
pkjxjϕj − 1
 . (5)
II. GENERAL SOLUTION FOR THE CASE |G| = 2
Let us consider the two-competitor scenario, G = {1, 2}, first without any constraint on the elements of the matrix
P . The conservation of nodes, x1 +x2 = 1, implies that the dynamics of the system, Eq. (2), can be tracked with the
single equation
x˙1 = x1(1− x1)
[
1
(1− α2)x1 + α2 −
1
(α1 − 1)x1 + 1
]
, (6)
where we have defined α1 = p11/p21 and α2 = p22/p12. Note that α1, α2 ≥ 0 since the elements of matrix P are
probabilities. Note also that the system is static regardless of its initial conditions whenever α1 = α2 = 1. From
Eq. (6), we can readily identify the three possible fixed points
x
∗(1)
1 = 0 ; x
∗(2)
1 = 1 ; x
∗(3)
1 =
1
1 + (α1−1)(α2−1)
, (7)
with 0 ≤ x∗(3)1 ≤ 1 whenever
(α1 − 1)
(α2 − 1) ≥ 0 . (8)
From Eq. (4), we see that the elements of the Jacobian matrix become
J11 = x2(β12 − β21) + x1x2(β11β21 − β212) (9a)
J12 = x1(β12 − β21)− x1x2(β12β22 − β221) (9b)
J21 = −x2(β12 − β21)− x1x2(β11β21 − β212) (9c)
J22 = −x1(β12 − β21) + x1x2(β12β22 − β221) (9d)
where we have defined βij = pijϕj . Noting that J11J22 − J12J21 = 0, we find that the eigenvalues, λ, of the Jacobian
matrix are the solution of
λ(J11 + J22 − λ) = 0 . (10)
The first eigenvalue λ1 = 0 is the result of the conservation of the nodes limiting the dynamics to a single line in the
phase space (x1, x2). The second eigenvalue, λ2, is
λ2 = (x2 − x1)(β12 − β21) + x1x2(β11β21 + β12β22 − β212 − β221) . (11)
Substituting Eq. (7) into this last result, we find that each fixed point is stable whenever
λ
(1)
2 =
1
α2
− 1 < 0 (12a)
λ
(2)
2 =
1
α1
− 1 < 0 (12b)
λ
(3)
2 = x
∗(3)
1
(
1− x∗(3)1
)
β212(α1 + α2 − 2) < 0 . (12c)
3Using these results, the condition (8) can be written as
α1λ
(2)
2
α2λ
(1)
2
≥ 0 (13)
which implies that x
∗(1)
1 and x
∗(2)
1 have the same stability whenever 0 ≤ x∗(3)1 ≤ 1 and have different stabilities
otherwise. From Eq. (12c), we see that x
∗(3)
1 is stable when
α1λ
(1)
2 + α2λ
(2)
2 > 0 , (14)
which in turn implies that x
∗(3)
1 has a different stability than x
∗(1)
1 and x
∗(2)
1 whenever x
∗(3)
1 ∈ [0, 1].
III. SOLUTION FOR |G| = 2 WITH STRATEGIC TRADEOFF
To emulate limited resources, we constrain the matrix p to the following structure
p =
(
p1 1− p1
1− p2 p2
)
, (15)
where 0 ≤ p1, p2 ≤ 1 are two free parameters. Combining Eq. (15) and the conservation condition x2 = 1 − x1, we
obtain that the differential equation describing the dynamics of the |G| = 2 scenario is
x˙1 =
x1(1− x1)(1− p1)
x1(1− p1) + (1− x1)p2 −
x1(1− x1)(1− p2)
x1p1 + (1− x1)(1− p2) , (16)
From the complete analysis of this model given in Sec. II, we readily identify the three fixed points
x
∗(1)
1 = 0 , (17a)
x
∗(2)
1 = 1 , (17b)
x
∗(3)
1 =
(
1 +
1− p1
1− p2
)−1
. (17c)
and draw the following conclusions:
• If p1 + p2 < 1, both x∗(1)1 and x∗(2)1 are unstable and x∗(3)1 is stable:
– Competitor 1 wins majority if p1 > p2;
– It is a tie if p1 = p2;
– Competitor 2 wins majority if p1 < p2.
• If p1+p2 = 1, the system is static—x1(t) = x1(0) for all time t—and the winning strategy is trivially determined
by the initial conditions:
– Competitor 1 wins majority if x1(0) > 1/2;
– It is a draw if x1(0) = 1/2;
– Competitor 2 wins majority if x1(0) < 1/2.
• If p1 + p2 > 1, both x∗(1)1 and x∗(2)1 are stable and x∗(3)1 is unstable:
– Competitor 1 wins by unanimity if x1(0) >
(
1 + 1−p11−p2
)−1
;
– No draw is possible;
– Competitor 2 wins by unanimity if x1(0) <
(
1 + 1−p11−p2
)−1
.
4IV. ANALYSIS OF FIXED POINTS IN THE CASE |G| > 2
We change our focus to a scenario where more than two competitors compete to rally a majority of nodes. Eqs. (5)
are non-linear, and their fixed points could be non-trivial in principle. However, from Eq. (2) we see that setting
xi = 0 constrains the phase space of the dynamics to the set of the remaining G\i competitors. In other words, all
pairwise fixed points (i.e., fixed points with at most two non-zero x∗k) are already known. With |G| = 3, the missing
fixed points thus correspond to steady states where x∗k > 0 ∀ k ∈ 1, 2, 3; and so on as we add competitors. It turns
out that (a) we can find the unique bulk fixed point of the |G| competitors case and (b) build the other fixed points
recursively from the |G| − 1 competitors cases, all the way down to |G| = 2. For the sake of clarity, we define g = |G|
in what follows.
A. Bulk fixed point
We define bulk fixed points as vectors ~x∗ whose elements x∗k > 0 ∀ k, and for which x˙k
∣∣
~x∗ = 0 ∀ k. In this section,
we obtain an analytical expression for the bulk fixed points and show that only a single one exists for each g = 2, 3, ....
By definition of the bulk fixed point, one must exclude x∗k = 0 from ~x
∗, for all k. This is done by factoring out the
leading xk (i.e., the x
∗
k = 0 root) from Eq. (5). We are left with the simpler system
x˙k =
∑
j
pkjx
∗
jϕ
∗
j − 1 = 0 k = 1, 2, .., g . (18)
Notice that Eq. (18) can be written in matrix form as
Pz = 1 (19)
where P is the g × g matrix of parameters {pij} and where the kth element of z is defined as zk := x∗kφ∗k. Provided
that P is invertible, one finds
z = P−11 ⇐⇒ x∗kφ∗k = sk k = 1, 2, .., g , (20)
where sk is defined as the sum of the k
th row of the invert of P . It then becomes apparent that we have removed the
non-linear terms of Eq. (2); multiplying by (ϕ∗k)
−1 on both sides yields a system of linear equations for x∗:
x∗k − sk
(∑
j
pjkx
∗
j
)
= 0 k = 1, 2, .., g . (21)
Note that in solving (21), we have no guarantee that
∑
j x
∗
j = 1. It could therefore be that x
∗ is not a distribution.
This problem is addressed by removing a redundant equation for x∗g (without loss of generality), and using the
normalization condition
g∑
j=1
x∗j = 1 ⇐⇒ x∗g ≡ 1−
∑
j<g
x∗j . (22)
We are then guaranteed that the solutions of the resulting equation,
x∗k − sk
∑
j<g
(pjk − pgk)x∗j = skpgk k = 1, 2, .., g − 1 , (23)
are normalized bulk fixed point. Eq. (22) can be used to recover x∗g explicitly. The solution is unique as long as
the system (23) is independent. The solution can be a non-bulk fixed point if the point is degenerated. Without
loss of generality, suppose x∗g−1 = 0, such that the g-competitors “bulk-point” actually is not non-zero for all k.
Equation (23) tells us that this can only happen if
sg−1pg,g−1 = 0 , (24)
i.e. if the sum of the (g− 1)th row of the P−1 is zero. The other possibility, pg,g−1 = 0, can be avoided by removing a
different row in Eq. 22, and will only lead to unavoidable degenerated bulk point in the `th dimension if pj,` = 0 ∀ j.
Note that solutions can still reside outside of the simplex, i.e. x∗j < 0 for some j, which we ignore as they are
non-physical fixed points.
5B. On fixed points recurrence
Let us consider, without loss of generality, that x∗g = 0 and
∑
j<g x
∗
j = 1. Then Eqs. (18) become
x˙k
∣∣∣∣
~x∗
= x∗k
∑
j<g
x∗jpkjϕj − 1
 k = 1, 2, .., g − 1 , (25a)
x˙g
∣∣∣∣
~x∗
= 0 , (25b)
ϕj
∣∣∣∣
~x∗
:=
∑
`<g
x∗`p`j
−1 . (25c)
where x∗ is here any fixed point which satisfies the criterion stated above. We immediately recover Eqs. (18) for g−1
competitors by removing the trivial Eq. (25b), and redefining the summation limits. Therefore, given a g competitors
system, one can obtain all fixed points where one of the components is null from the g − 1 competitors system,
recursively, all the way down to g = 2 which we fully solved previously.
To enumerate all fixed points, we therefore only need to
1. Find the bulk point for g competitors.
2. For all ` = 1, 2, ..., g, set x∗` = 0 and go back to step 1 with g
′ = g − 1.
The procedures stops once we reach g′ = 2.
C. Scenario with strategic tradeoffs
In the scenario with strategic tradeoff, we have
prs = prδrs + (1− pr)δ¯rs ≡ (1− pr) + δrs(2pr − 1) . (26)
The resulting P matrices are full rank matrices whenever there is at most one pr = 1/2; all rows are independent
from one another because of their diagonal element. Incidentally, any pair of competitors with both pr = 1/2 will
remain at their initial conditions as in the case with two competitors. In that case, we do not expect a single bulk
point, but a hyper-plane of fixed points that connects g − 2 edges parallel to the competitors pair edge, along every
faces of the simplex (see Fig. 1 for example).
For all other cases, the inverse of P can be calculated exactly using the Sherman-Morrison formula and the matrix
representation P = [2 diag(P )− I] + (1+P )1T , where P is the column matrix of probabilities pr and 1 is a column
matrix of 1. One finds
[P−1]rs =
δrs
2pr − 1 −
(1− pr)
(2pr − 1)(2ps − 1)
1 +∑
j
1− pj
2pj − 1
−1 (27)
Combining the recursive strategy of § IV B and Eq. (23) yields the position of all fixed points. Moreover, Eq. (27)
allows us to compute sk—we simply sum over each row of the inverse matrix—and obtain a condition for sk = 0, i.e., a
condition that predicts whether the “fixed bulk point” is degenerated and actually lives on the edges of the g-simplex
(see Eq. 24). Doing so, we obtain the following condition for the non-existence of bulk point in the g competitors case
(with strategic tradeoffs) ∑
j
pk
2pj − 1 =
∑
j
pj
2pj − 1 for any k = 1, .., g. (28)
6(0, 0, 1)
(0, 1, 0) (1, 0, 0)
FIG. 1. Example of hyperplanes in the phase space. Competitors 1 and 2 (right and left corners respectively) are given
the strategy p = 1/2, and the strategy of competitor 3 (bottom corner) is set to p = 1/5. The matrix P is not full rank, and
the flow is therefore degenerated—the only interactions arise from the presence of competitor 3. A line of fixed points appears
parallel to the (1,0,0)–(0,1,0) edge of the simplex.
V. COMPLETE TWITTER ANALYSIS AND MODELING
A. Raw data from Ref. [13] in main text.
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FIG. 2. Political tweets. Proportion of tweets by authors of estimated ideology x retweeted by users of estimated ideology
y, where x, y ∈ [−3, 3] denotes the estimated ideology of the users. Strongly liberal users are given a score of −3 and strongly
conservative users are given a score of +3. Topics are, from left to right and top to bottom: 2012 election, federal budget,
government shutdown, marriage equality, minimum wage and the state of the union.
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FIG. 3. Non-political tweets. Proportion of tweets by authors of estimated ideology x retweeted by users of estimated
ideology y, where x, y ∈ [−3, 3] denotes the estimated ideology of the users. Strongly liberal users are given a score of −3
and strongly conservative users are given a score of +3. Topics are, from left to right and top to bottom: Boston marathon,
Newtown shooting, 2014 Oscars, Super Bowl, Syria, and the 2014 Winter Olympics.
B. Normalized matrices and coarse graining
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FIG. 4. Strategies from political tweets. Row-normalized retweet matrices yield potential strategy matrices. Dotted lines
indicate the coarse-graining used to obtain a 3 competitor dynamics. Topics are, from left to right and top to bottom: 2012
election, federal budget, government shutdown, marriage equality, minimum wage and the state of the union.
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FIG. 5. Strategies from non-political tweets. Row-normalized retweet matrices yield potential strategy matrices. Dotted
lines indicate the coarse-graining used to obtain a 3 competitor dynamics. Topics are, from left to right and top to bottom:
Boston marathon, Newtown shooting, 2014 Oscars, Super Bowl, Syria, and the 2014 Winter Olympics.
C. Flows in the prevalence space
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FIG. 6. Flows in the prevalence space of political tweets. The flows are obtained with our equations for arbitrary density
matrices P . Topics are, from left to right and top to bottom: 2012 election, federal budget, government shutdown, marriage
equality, minimum wage and the state of the union. Point (1,0,0) correspond to a liberal outcome, (0,1,0) to a centrist outcome
and (0,0,1) to a conservative outcome. All fixed points are shown with filled black circles, and their stability can be inferred
from the trajectories around them.
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FIG. 7. Flows in the prevalence space of non-political tweets. The flows are obtained with our equations for arbitrary
density matrices P . Topics are, from left to right and top to bottom: Boston marathon, Newtown shooting, 2014 Oscars, Super
Bowl, Syria, and the 2014 Winter Olympics. Point (1,0,0) correspond to a liberal outcome, (0,1,0) to a centrist outcome and
(0,0,1) to a conservative outcome. All fixed points are shown with filled black circles, and their stability can be inferred from
the trajectories around them.
